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1 Case Study / Burundi
To what extent was the conflict 
in Burundi generated by lack of 
inclusion of a group or groups 
in the state’s political and legal 
structures? Was there a lack 
of human rights protection 
for the excluded group? 
Since independence in 1961, the Burundian 
political landscape has been polarised, 
marked by political assassinations and 
large-scale violence. For the following two 
decades, dictatorships led by three Tutsi 
military regimes associated with UPRONA 
(Union pour le Progrès National – Union for 
National Progress)1 ruled the country. This 
period encompassed numerous waves of 
mass violence: from the attempts of various 
opposition rebel groups to destabilise the 
regimes, and from the regimes’ use of violence 
to repress such attempts. While violence in 
Burundi has been long described as ethnic 
violence between the Hutu majority and 
the minority Tutsi elite,2 it is now widely 
acknowledged that there is a multiplicity 
of causes for the mass violence, entangled 
with political and social identities more broadly. 
The exclusion of ethnic, social or political 
groups from the political space and its attached 
benefits has motivated the formation of rebel 
groups, and the use of violence to challenge, 
acquire or maintain political privileges. 
While the origin and nature of ethnicity 
in Burundi is still widely debated (Daley 2006; 
Vandeginste 2014), exclusion from state 
structures was institutionalised under the 
Belgian colonial rule by, for example, granting 
socio-economic and political privileges to the 
Tutsi (such as exclusive access to education 
and administration positions). A series 
of events following the assassination of 
Prince Rwagasore in 1961 contributed to the 
polarisation of Burundi’s political landscape 
along ethnic lines (Lemarchand 1996)3. 
Throughout, the state operated through 
clientelism and rent-seeking (Curtis 2012). 
During the military dictatorships, large-scale 
violence resulted from numerous attempts 
by excluded political actors to destabilise the 
authoritarian regimes, and counter-violence 
to repress these failed attempts. 
The most dramatic demonstration of 
the exclusionary nature of Burundi’s political 
system, and of violence resulting in widespread 
violations of human rights and genocide, came 
in 1972 (Lemarchand, 2011). A failed coup by 
Hutu gendarmerie and an uprising of Hutu 
rebels led to the killing of thousands of Tutsi. 
The army responded by killing all educated 
Hutu. Within three months, it is believed 
that 2,000 to 3,000 Tutsi, and 100,000 
to 200,000 Hutu were killed. Around 300,000 
Hutu left the country to seek refuge in 
neighbouring countries (Daley, 1991). In 1988, 
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several hundred Tutsi were killed by Hutu rebels 
and, in reprisal, Tutsi military killed 20,000 Hutu. 
Finally pressurised to open up the political 
space, President Pierre Buyoya – an UPRONA 
Tutsi military chief of staff who took power in 
1987 – placed Hutu representatives in a variety 
of important political roles and organised 
a democratic election. Due to his efforts in 
opening the political space, Buyoya thought 
he would win the elections. 
Instead, Melchior Ndadaye, from the 
prominently Hutu party FRODEBU (Front 
pour la Démocratie au Burundi – Front for 
Democracy in Burundi) created in 1992, won 
and became the first democratically elected 
President in 1993. He was assassinated three 
months after taking his post by the most 
extreme Tutsi elements in the military who 
feared the inclusion of Hutu in political affairs. 
As a result, civil war broke out. The war forced 
400,000 people to flee to foreign countries 
and displaced 800,000 from their homes. 
After peace talks gradually integrated various 
parties from 1994 to 2009, the country enjoyed 
relative peace (or less violence). However, in 
2015, a new wave of political violence started 
after President Pierre Nkurunziza, from the 
CNDD-FDD (Conseil National pour la Défense 
de la Démocratie – Forces de Défense de la 
Démocratie – National Council for the Defense 
of Democracy – Forces for the Defense of 
Democracy)4 which had been in power since 
2005, won a contested third term. The current 
political landscape clearly excludes political 
actors who opposed the President’s third term.
How did reform initiatives or various 
peace processes try to address this? 
From 1994 to 2009, 20 agreements were 
signed by different sets of political parties 
and rebel groups with the aim to end the 
Burundian conflict. These agreements can 
be understood in terms of four processes. 
First, two agreements were signed in 1994 
by those who were seen as “authorised 
political parties” as a call to stop violence 
and confidence-building measures. Second, 
seven agreements between 1998 and 2005 
included the preparation, adoption of the 
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3 Case Study / Burundi
Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement 
and its translation into the constitutional 
framework: it included 19 different parties but 
not the CNDD-FDD and the PALIPEHUTU-
FNL.5 Third, the process between 2002 and 
2003 (comprising six agreements) negotiated 
a ceasefire and the integration of the CNDD-
FDD into political, institutional and security 
structures. Fourth, a set of five agreements 
between 2006 and 2009 entailed a ceasefire 
and provided for the integration of the 
PALIPEHUTU-FNL into political, institutional 
and security systems. Burundi was also involved 
in the regional peace process (2004–2013) 
that addressed the relations between the 
Burundian, Rwandan, Congolese, Central 
African and Ugandan conflicts.
When Buyoya (the leader of UPRONA at the 
time) deposed the President in July 1996 in his 
second successful coup, neighbouring countries 
placed an economic embargo and other sanctions 
on Burundi (Grauvogel, 2015).6 The pressure 
led to negotiations and the signature of the 
Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement 
for Burundi in August 2000 in Arusha, Tanzania. 
The agreement did not include the two active 
rebel groups and was signed reluctantly by the 
19 signatories representing the Government of 
Burundi, the National Assembly, and 17 political 
parties. These political parties were divided 
into two interest groups based upon ethnic 
ideology – the “G-7” of Hutu dominated parties 
and the “G-10” of Tutsi dominated parties 
– although the degree of ethnic allegiance 
among these parties varied (Daley 2007). The 
peace agreement could not bring an end to the 
hostilities, but it provided for major institutional 
reforms. The Arusha Peace and Reconciliation 
Agreement was a comprehensive document, 
addressing four key matters: 1) It provided an 
in-depth historical analysis of the “nature of the 
conflict, problems of genocide” and guarantees 
of non-repetition; 2) It provided for transitional 
arrangements and constitutional principles of 
the post-transition constitution to promote 
democracy and good governance; 3) It called for 
peace and security for all through the adoption 
of a ceasefire and a reform of the security 
sector; 4) It defined how the reconstruction 
and development should be achieved through 
rehabilitation and resettlement of refugees and 
victims, physical and political reconstruction, 
and economic and social development.
The CNDD-FDD and the Burundian 
authorities signed six agreements between 
2002 and 2003 that included a ceasefire, 
transformation of CNDD-FDD into a 
political party, power-sharing arrangements, 
and the integration of their members 
into the security forces. The CNDD-FDD 
won the presidential election in 2005 
and has been the leading political party 
in Burundi since then. The PALIPEHUTU-
FNL and Burundian authorities signed five 
agreements (between 2006 and 2009): 
these provide for a ceasefire, the integration 
of PALIPEHUTU-FNL into security forces, 
and the transformation of PALIPEHUTU-
FNL into a political party. These two sets of 
agreements also include provisional immunity 
for the members of the two armed groups, 
provisions related to the return of refugees, 
and the demobilisation, disarmament and 
reintegration of rebels. Overall, these various 
peace agreements introduced a complex 
institutional framework that includes ambitious 
political, judiciary and military power-sharing 
arrangements and provides for the creation 
of various commissions to deal with specific 
groups as detailed below.
How did inclusion and protection 
of rights feature in the agreements 
or constitutional and institutional 
reform approaches? 
A broad and inclusive power-sharing system 
had already been gradually integrated into the 
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institutional structures from 1992 onwards, 
to deal with the problem of political ethnic 
exclusion (Reyntjens 2016). Arusha and 
the subsequent agreements defined how 
the problem of exclusion was created and 
elaborated through complex institutional 
arrangements to promote further inclusion 
and national unity by seeking regional, ethnic 
and gender equilibrium. Both Arusha and the 
2005 Constitution define “ethnicity” as a major 
cause of the conflict. These texts outline three 
principles to redress the issue: minority political 
parties should be included in the democratic 
process; the protection and inclusion of ethnic, 
cultural and religious minority groups should 
be integrated into the general system of 
governance; and national security and justice 
should be restructured to guarantee the 
security of all Burundians, including the ethnic 
minorities (as described in the preamble of the 
constitution). Throughout the constitution, 
these principles are translated into the 
political and legal structures by requiring 
the representatives of reformed public 
institutions (the government, the legislative 
power, the army, the police, etc.), to represent 
the ethnic diversity of Burundian society in 
their composition and the undertaking of 
their duties. 
Based on consociationalist principles, 
these arrangements established quotas, 
minority over-representation and minority 
veto through a set of rules in the composition 
of the government, the National Assembly, 
the Senate and security forces. For instance, 
the constitution stipulates that government 
must include “at most 60% of Hutu Ministers 
and Vice-Ministers; at most 40% of Tutsi 
Ministers and Vice-Ministers; a minimum of 
30% of women” (Article 129). The National 
Assembly is composed of “at least 100 Deputies 
on the basis of 60% of Hutu and 40% of 
Tutsi, including a minimum of 30% of women, 
and of three co-opted Twa” (Article 164). 
The defence and security forces “may not 
include more than 50% of the members 
belonging to a particular ethnic group” 
(Article 257). “Minister given the charge of 
the Force of National Defence is not of the 
same ethnicity as the Minister responsible for 
the National Police” (Article 130) (Constitute 
Project 2016).
The constitution requires that all political 
parties and electoral lists must be multi-ethnic. 
More specifically, a political party might not 
be based on ethnic affiliation (Article 78) and 
legislative electoral lists must have a multi-
ethnic character and gender equilibrium 
(Article 168). A variety of measures and 
institutions have been put in place to promote 
the principle of the equality of rights for “all the 
ethnic, political, regional and social components 
of Burundian society” (this includes: the 
National Commission for National Unity and 
Reconciliation; the National Observatory 
for the Prevention and the Eradication of 
Genocide, of War Crimes and of Crimes Against 
Humanity; the National Council of Security; the 
Economic and Social Council; and the National 
Council of Communication – as detailed under 
Title XII in the constitution).
How did the peace or reform process 
approach inclusivity: did it focus 
just on the dominant groups at the 
heart of the conflict? To what extent 
did it also attempt broader inclusion 
of other groups and interests? 
The inclusion agenda in Burundi has been 
driven by various national and regional 
dimensions. As mentioned above, these 
institutional reforms claim to promote ethnic, 
regional and gender equilibrium through the 
composition of the governmental, judicial, 
and security institutions. However, the process 
in negotiating and implementing inclusion 
demonstrates certain limitations, as it has 
5 Case Study / Burundi
been driven by existing political dynamics 
and power disequilibrium.
First, the Arusha peace process in itself was 
not sufficiently inclusive. The 19 signatories 
“expressed reservations about key provisions” 
and “did not embrace it sincerely” (Reyntjens 
2016, 68). The CNDD-FDD and PALIPEHUTU-FNL 
were not involved in the talks and rejected the 
accord – and remained active rebel groups 
until 2003 and 2009 respectively. The lack of 
inclusion in the initial peace process meant 
that violence and human rights violations 
continued until 2009 (Vandeginste 2011). 
The PALIPEHUTU-FNL and CNDD-FDD only 
bought into the process and were pressurised 
to commit to Arusha principles as this was a 
requirement before being authorised to enter 
political institutions. 
Furthermore, the inclusion agenda was 
a response to pressure from foreign mediators 
and the previous Tutsi elite fear of losing 
power through democratisation with the Hutu 
demographic majority turning into an ethnic 
political domination rather than seeking a 
fairer repartition of power (Reyntjens 2016, 
67). Such arrangements forced the winning 
FRODEBU government to share power with the 
actors behind the murder of Ndadaye in 1994 
(Daley 2006, 671). It also led to a proliferation of 
parties due to the equal status for participating 
groups and “unrestrictive application of 
power sharing” (from four parties in 1996 to 
17 in 2000) (Lemarchand 2006). This meant 
that creating a new party would grant more 
political benefits in future institutional settings 
than alignment with existing political parties. 
This could be seen to have contributed to 
“factionalism within the rebel movements” 
(Daley 2007, 341–2). However, “[most] of these 
newcomers had no constituencies to speak of 
beyond a handful of relatives and friends, their 
primary concern being to cash in on per diems 
and perquisites and position themselves for 
access to government positions” (Lemarchand 
2006, 10). Despite these limitations, power-
sharing arrangements led to the successful 
transition to multi-party democracy and put an 
end to the conflict thanks to “unprecedented 
de-polarisation of the political arena” 
(Lemarchand 2006, 11).
The Arusha reforms could also be seen 
to have corrected the “ethnic imbalance 
among the elite” but to have left intact 
the contradictions within society: “the 
continued instrumental and often violent 
use of ethnicity by the political elite and the 
failure of the peace process to move beyond 
ethnic categorisation” would not provide 
the basis for “a more inclusive democratic 
participatory politics that see the ordinary 
Burundian as part of a broader political 
community with equal allegiance and rights 
to the state, essential pre-conditions for the 
sort of societal transformation that is vital for 
lasting peace and stability” (Daley 2006, 658–9). 
The current context shows how the exclusion 
of political opponents and potential opposition 
at all levels of power frequently leads to human 
rights violations. Burundi’s institutions, despite 
being formally inclusive, have not succeeded 
in creating a broader sense of a common 
political community.
Today, while it respects institutional 
requirements, the political configuration is 
marked by a paradoxical situation in which the 
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6 Case Study / Burundi
CNDD-FDD operates almost as a single state 
party with popular support. This ruling party 
“retained popularity with its rural constituents 
by providing social services, such as free 
primary education and healthcare for the most 
vulnerable” (Reyntjens 2016, 72) but continued 
to employ violence and human rights violations 
as a political tool to exclude its political 
opponents – this without real accountability, 
despite the legal obligations to respect 
fundamental rights. 
Reviewing the institutional engineering in 
line with today’s conflict, Reyntjens considers 
that the consociational state organisation 
has been successful in promoting a political 
transformation. Such institutional engineering 
“diminished ethnicity as an electoral issue 
… but failed to produce better governance” 
(Reyntjens 2016, 66). However, the multi-ethnic 
party system is again leading to a similar use 
of political violence. This reinforces the idea 
that creating political structures along the lines 
of ethnic identity was crucial in justifying and 
using violence for political power. Even though 
ethnicity is not the central problem anymore, 
political violence remains a problem while the 
regime is respecting the new institutional rules.  
In conclusion, the institutionalised power-
sharing still conceals negotiations among 
political elites in line with their affiliations, 
leaving certain fringes of society excluded, 
particularly those opposed to the third 
mandate today. On the one hand, it can be 
claimed that Arusha and the consequent 
constitutional reforms have been successfully 
implemented. For instance, the Peace 
Agreement Matrix considers that 78% of 
the Arusha peace agreement has been 
implemented over 10 years.7 On the other hand, 
political violence and human rights violations 
continue to be a crucial tool to access, maintain 
or contest political power. This also includes an 
absolute political and security breakdown since 
the elections in 2015.
What were the critical moments 
when attempts at inclusion could 
have succeeded (and did not) 
or failed (and did not)? What 
factors – in country leadership, 
civil society mobilisation and 
international intervention 
– determined whether they 
succeeded or failed?
In addition to political struggles mentioned 
above, the self-exclusion of most opposition 
parties in the 2010 elections is crucial to an 
understanding of the exclusive nature of the 
current regime, its adherence to institutional 
power-sharing requirements and the return to 
larger-scale violence. During the 2010 electoral 
process, most opposition parties gathered 
under the coalition ADC-Ikibiri (l’Alliance des 
Démocrates pour le Changement au Burundi – 
Alliance for Democrats for Change in Burundi). 
They thought that elections were rigged by the 
ruling party, the CNDD-FDD, and assumed that 
the international community would support 
them to reorganise free and fair elections. The 
international community continued to support 
the electoral process and accepted its results. 
Consequently, the CNDD-FDD maintained 
the presidential and most ministerial seats 
(Vandeginste 2011; ICG 2011). An electoral 
boycott weakened the balance provided for in 
the constitution and backfired on the coalition 
ADC-Ikibiri – as the CNDD-FDD obtained 76% 
of parliamentary seats (Reyntjens 2016, 72). This 
led to the establishment of a de facto one-party 
state ruled by the CNDD-FDD (Vandeginste 
2015). Over the years from 2010 until today, the 
CNDD-FDD consolidated its power with the 
prominence of high-level political actors with 
strong military backgrounds. The repercussions 
of the withdrawal of most opposition parties 
from elections continue to have consequences 
in terms of the composition of institutions 
and the respect of human rights values. 
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Because of an emphasis on stability and 
pleased by the apparent peace, international 
peacebuilders “largely turned a blind eye to 
governance abuses, human rights violations, 
and militarism, when confronted with the 
messy and contested politics of transition” 
(Curtis 2012, 74–75). However, the degradation 
in security, democracy and development has 
been perceptible for a long time. CNDD-FDD 
governance practices have been referred to 
as the “système DD” marked by corruption, 
misappropriation, brutality, torture, and 
murder (Hirschy and Lafont 2015). They have 
also severely suppressed the opposition, the 
press, and civil society. Despite broad but 
discrete critiques inside and outside of the 
country, the populist politics of the CNDD-
FDD attracted strong support from rural 
communities, where most other political 
parties have limited constituency.
Opposition to the mandate for a third 
term of President Nkurunziza (CNDD-
FDD) continues to cause major problems. 
In 2014, the Movement for Solidarity and 
Development (Mouvement pour la solidarité 
et le développement – MSD)8 organised 
a march to demonstrate against a third 
presidential mandate. Some 70 demonstrators 
were arrested; most of them received heavy 
sentences although they were released in 
January 2017 (BBC 2014; Ndabashinze and 
Nzeyimana 2017). Acts of violence committed 
by the Imbonerakure (Kirundi for “those who 
see far” youth members of the ruling party) 
are reported weekly. Between December 
2014 and January 2015, clashes occurred in 
Cibitoke, the north-eastern province, between 
an armed group and Burundian armed forces. 
At a societal level, there are many other issues 
that have been exacerbated by the conflict 
and the current deteriorating context. The 
justice system is not considered to operate 
impartially (More 2010) and corruption is a 
common occurrence (ICG 2012). Land disputes 
are considered to be a major social issue, 
particularly due to the economic crisis, land 
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8 Case Study / Burundi
grabbing, and the return of at least 200,000 
refugees since 2000. Burundi is considered the 
country with the highest hunger indicator in 
Africa (ICG 2014).
On 26 April 2015, President Nkurunziza 
announced he was standing as candidate 
for presidential elections. Shortly after this 
announcement, much wider demonstrations 
against his candidacy started to take place 
in the capital, Bujumbura. The police used 
violence against demonstrators, some of 
whom responded by throwing stones back 
at the police (BBC 2015; Associated Press 
in Burundi 2015). After a failed coup in May 
2015, the situation escalated further. On one 
side, the most fervent supporters of the 
Nkurunziza presidency consider that a third 
term for Nkurunziza is legal. On the other side 
of the political spectrum, many opponents 
consider that a third term is illegal and fails 
to respect the constitution and Arusha peace 
agreements. The opposition boycotted 
the elections again in 2015. The resulting 
government further threatened the political 
equilibrium with the CNDD-FDD gaining a 
stronger majority in both the executive and 
legislative state structures. All these elements 
are crucial factors in the gradual closure of 
non-violent channels to political opportunities 
and the consequent failure of democratisation 
and efforts of inclusion.
How transformative has the process 
been on the inclusion front? If not 
transformative now, were there 
transformative moments, or is there 
further transformative potential?
The most recent development in Burundi 
inevitably leads to negative conclusions in 
terms of political transformation. Since the 
controversial candidacy of Pierre Nkurunziza 
and his re-election for a third presidential 
term in 2015 (Jamar 2016; Vandeginste 2016),9 
gross human rights violations have been 
widely reported, more than 1,000 people 
have been killed, thousands have reportedly 
been tortured, unknown numbers of women 
have been victims of various forms of sexual 
crimes, hundreds of people have been forcibly 
disappeared, and thousands remain in illegal 
detention. From April 2015 to August 2016, 
286,036 people sought refuge in neighbouring 
countries. Burundi is again experiencing 
a major violent political crisis.
Despite appearances, this is not the 
political status quo. Over the last two decades, 
institutional reforms led to a major power 
reconfiguration. Previous rebel groups became 
key political players. The military and police 
forces successfully adopted ethnic quotas. 
The political scene is still fragmented but 
frictions are mainly occurring within and in 
between “Hutu parties” (Reyntjens 2016, 72); 
the UPRONA (dominantly Tutsi party that ruled 
the almost one-party state from 1961 to 1993)  
became a minor political party. However, the 
political game remains in the hands of a political 
elite and the political landscape continues to 
be marked by violence to maintain political 
privileges, despite the promotion of inclusion 
and fundamental rights. It could be considered 
that these elite pacts “leave the extant social 
system intact” and are “not conditional on the 
cessation of direct violence”. Further, they can 
legitimise opportunistic and violent behaviours. 
The Arusha peace process’ emphasis on such 
institutional reforms missed an opportunity 
for tackling social injustice (Daley 2007, 
334, 349, passim).
Institutional reforms in relation to 
respecting human rights and preventing 
human rights violations have mostly been 
implemented. They were, however, ineffective 
in providing actual protection for victims of 
human rights violations or in discouraging 
the political use of violence.  The CNDD-FDD 
regime continues to function with violence: 
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respecting constitutional power-sharing 
provisions but neglecting rule of law principles. 
Future peace talks should aim to readdress 
the issue of broader inclusion and encourage 
actual political coalitions, instead of the current 
system based on allied parties that not only 
accept the President’s mandate for a third term 
but also align to his political agenda.
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Endnotes
1 UPRONA was created by Prince Louis 
Rwagasore in 1958. The party is predominantly 
Tutsi but initially it had also strong support from 
the Hutu, until its radicalisation in later years.
2 The Burundian population is considered to be 
composed of 83% Hutu, 16% Tutsi and 1% Twa.
3 The UPRONA was divided into two factions, 
the monarchy faced a legitimacy crisis, 
and thousands of Tutsi refugees fled 
from Rwanda to Burundi.
4 The party was created out of the jointure 
of the CNDD, the political wing and the 
FDD, the military wing of the group funded 
in reaction to Ndadaye’s assassination by 
FRODEBU in 1994. It registered as CNDD-FDD 
as a national party in  2005. It won the election 
on the same year and had been the ruling 
party with Pierre Nkurunziza as the President. 
The political crisis of 2015 started with debates 
and violence related to the third presidential 
term of Nkurunziza.
5 The Party for the Liberation of the Hutu People 
– National Forces of Liberation (PALIPEHUTU-
FNL from its French acronym, Parti pour la 
liberation du Peuple Hutu – Forces Nationales 
de Liberation) which turned into the FNL due 
to interdiction to strict ethnic affiliation 
for political parties.
6 Under the regional framework initiative, 
the heads of Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, 
Uganda, Zaire, and the Secretary General of 
the Organisation of African Unity condemned 
the coup and imposed economic sanctions and 
travel bans to seek a return to constitutional 
order and inclusive peace negotiations. 
The embargo was initially endorsed by main 
Western donors through development aid cuts, 
but later condemned by some international 
actors. See reliefweb.int/report/burundi/report-
regional-sanctions-against-burundi
7 Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for 
Burundi. peaceaccords.nd.edu/accord/arusha-
peace-and-reconciliation-agreement-burundi
8 The MSD is a political party created in 2007 and 
formally accredited by Burundian authorities 
in 2009. The party is rooted in civil society and 
independent media based in Bujumbura, led 
by Alexis Sinduhije, the founder and former 
director of the Radio Publique Africaine in 
Burundi, currently living in exile. It has been 
perceived as a threat by the CNDD-FDD. The 
party has been accused of having links with 
armed groups in the Democratic Republic of 
the  Congo (Van Acker 2016, p21).
9 The controversy over Nkurunziza’s mandate 
for a third term results from a legal loophole 
in the current constitution, limiting presidential 
candidates to run for two terms elected 
“by universal direct suffrage” (Article 96) but 
also stipulating that the first post-transition 
President would be elected by the Parliament 
(Article 163) – as is the case for Nkurunziza. 
While Nkurunziza’s most fervent supporters 
consider that a third term is legal, many 
opponents consider that this fails to respect 
the constitution and Arusha peace agreement.
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